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TWO VIEWS OF QUANTIF1CATION 
CHARLES W. SA YWARD 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
In this paper I discuss the distinction between the referential 
and substitutional interpretations of one of the basic concepts of 
modern logic-the concept expressed by "for all x." I try to bring out 
what is at stake in choosing between the two. Finally, I argue for the 
referential interpretation on the grounds that the substitutional inter· 
pretation allows defective formulation of sound principles. 
t t t 
One remarkable thing about modem logic is that the 
entire apparatus rests on just three basic concepts: the state· 
ment connective "not both ... and __ " "for all x" ("(x)" 
for short) and "=". There is controversy regarding the second 
of these concepts. One view has it that 
(1) A universally quantified statement (x) A, is true 
just in case every object satisfies A. 
This is the referential view. Another view has it that 
(2) A universally quantified statement, (x) A, is true 
just in case every substitutive instance of A is true. 
This is the substitutional view. 
You may think that the distinction between (1) and (2) 
is trivial. You would be wrong. Consider the innocuous claim 
(3) (Ex)x) 0 
"Something is greater than 0." The quantifier "(Ex)" is de-
fined as "not (x) not." This definition gives us these results. 
If you take (1) as your understanding of "(x)," then (3) is 
true just in case there exists at least one object greater than 
O. This means we have to admit the numbers greater than 0 
into o~ ontology as actually existing! The mind boggles. 
If you take the substitutional view, all you have to say is that 
(3) is true just in case some sentence of the form "x ) 0" 
is true. And you can say this without thereby admitting that 
numbers actually exist. 
At this point, one probably favors (2). But the problem 
is that there are good reasons for not adopting (2). A major 
contribution to the study of formal languages has been made 
by Alfred Tarski. Tarski proposed that any definition of the 
set of true sentences in a language, L, must be such that, for 
any sentences x and S, if S gives the truth conditions of x 
in L, then 
xistrueinL:::S 
should be derivable from the definition. This has been re-
ferred to in the literature as convention T. The use of con-
vention T has led to some really remarkable work in the study 
of formal systems. Recently, it has been shown that, in the 
case of languages at least as rich as elementary number theory, 
convention T cannot be satisfied using (2). It can be satisfied 
only if (1) is adopted. 
The defender of (2) can say: So much the worse for con-
vention T. We simply have the challenge now of fmding 
something in its place. 
My purpose in this paper is to raise doubts as to whether 
it is worthwhile even to try to meet this challenge. I shall 
argue that the use of (2) allows defective formulation or sound 
principles. It should be rejected on these grounds alone. 
I take as a starting point an argument recently proposed 
by Snyder (1971). Snyder argues that the absurdity, "All 
meaningless sentences are both true and false," could be 
deduced from four very plausible principles, which he uses the 
following formulas to express. 
(4) r P lis true::: p 
(5) r P lis false::: -p 
(6) r P I is true :::> r P I is meaningful 
(7) r P I is false:::> r p I is meaningful. 
The formulas tautologically imply 
(8) - r P I is meaningful :::> . r P I is true & r P I 
is false. 
letting the letter "P" range over sentences (8) is supposed to 
symbolize "All meaningless sentences are both true and false." 
The basic problem with all this is traceable to the fact 
that 'r p " means ''the result of putting p for the letter 'p' 
in 'po ,,, That is, 
(9) rp I=p. 
Rewriting (4) and (5) in accordance with this fact yields 
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p is true ==p 
p is false == -p 
which makes one doubt the interest of Snyder's deduction. 
Seen in this light, (4) and (5) have as instances notoriously 
ill-formed sentences (e.g., "Snow is white is true == slloW is 
white"). Of what interest, then, is Snyder's point? 
The interest comes out when we seek other verbaliza-
tions of the principles that (4)-(8) are supposed to express. 
Suppose we adopt the substitutional view of quantification. 
Then the expressions we seek are these: 
(10) (p)("p"is a sentence:)' "p"is true ==p) 
(11) (p)("p"is a sentence:)' "p"is false == -p) 
(12) (p) (Up" is a sentence & "p" is true' :) up" is 
meaningful) 
(13) (p) ("p" is a sentence & "p" is false' :) up" is 
meaningful). 
These sentences entail 
(14) (p) (Up" is a sentence & - "p"is meaningful':) 
"p" is true & "p" is false) 
which is our new expression of "All meaningless sentences are 
both true and false." 
Just how interesting or paradoxical it is that (14) follows 
from (10)-(13) depends upon how plaUSible one finds (10)-
(13) to be. The latter set of sentences is certainly defective 
in some respect since it entails a sentence that is not true. 
Two options are open at this point. First, one might agree 
'that (10)-(13) correctly express the relevant principles con-
cerning meaningfulness, truth, and falsity; the defectiveness 
of (10)-(13) would then be traceable to these principles. 
Second, one might disagree that (10)-(13) correctly express 
the relevant principles; the defectiveness of (10-(13) would 
then be traceable to the fact that we have used the substitu-
tion interpretation of the quantifiers in trying to express 
these principles. 
I think the second explanation is the better one. To 
support this contention, I shall argue that plausible expres-
sions of the four principles can be obtained using the referen-
tial interpretation of the quantifiers, and that, so expressed, 
the principles do not have the absurd result that all meaning-
less sentences are both true and false. 
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The expression of the first principle is this: 
(x) (x is a sentence:) the result of putting x for 
the letter "x" in "'x' is true == x" is a true sen-
. tence). 
Using quasi-quotation, this can be expressed less cumber-
somely: 
(15) (x) (x is a sentence :) I "x" is true == x -, is a 
true sentence). 
The rest of the principles are expressed as follows: 
(16) (x) (x is a sentence:) I"X" is false == -x -, is a 
true sentence). 
(17) (x) (x is a sentence & x is true' :) x is m~aning­
ful). 
(18) (x) (x is a sentence & x is false' :) x is meaning-
ful). ' 
It is a simple matter to prove that 
(19) (x) (x is a sentence & - x is meaningful' :) . x is 
true & x is false). 
does not follow from (15)-(18). 
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